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Abstract 
 Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy 
changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry’s 
political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze 
the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The 
welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is 
socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country 
setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international 
free-riding on innovations.  
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“What’s true of the eight-hundred-pound gorilla is true of the colossus that is the 
pharmaceutical industry. It is used to doing pretty much what it wants to do.” – Marcia 
Angell (2005, p. 3) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of laws enacted by 
the Congress, such as the Bayh Dole Act in 1980,1 the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984,2 the Prescription 
Drug User Fee Act of 1992,3 and the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.4 These 
policies result in an extension of the commercial lifetime of patents for brand-name drugs.5 So, why did 
the government implement all these policy changes?  
 At the first glance, the answer could be quite obvious that there must be incentives for the 
policymakers to do so. But, the real puzzle is about what exactly these incentives are. It may be the case 
that the government has the incentives to act as a social planner and to maximize social welfare as we, 
economists, usually like to assume. However, the reality is neither so simple nor ideal. Douglass North 
(2005, p. 67) describes the incentives of the government as, 
“The Government is not a disinterested party in the economy. By the very nature of the 
political process..., the government has strong incentives to behave opportunistically to 
                                                 
1
 The Bayh-Dole Act essentially allows universities and other non-profit institutions to patent discoveries from 
publicly funded medical research and then to grant exclusive licenses to drug companies. See, e.g. Jaffe (2000), 
Eisenberg (2001) and Angell (2005, chapter 1). 
2
 The Hatch-Waxman Act enables drug companies to extend monopoly rights by restoring up to five years of lost 
patent time on premarket testing and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process. See, e.g. Eisenberg 
(2001) and Gallini (2002). Also, as a result of this Act, “…if a brand-name company sues a generic company for 
patent infringement, FDA approval of the generic drug will automatically be delayed for [up to] thirty months… In 
effect, the FDA will add thirty months to the brand-name drug’s exclusivity.” Angell (2005, p. 179-180) 
3
 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 authorizes the FDA to collect user fees from the pharmaceutical 
industry and at the same time requires the FDA to significantly reduce its approval time for drugs. As a result, the 
FDA approval time decreases from 2.6 years to 1.4 years, which in turn increases the commercial lifetime of patents 
for drugs. See, e.g. NIHCM (2000). 
4
 The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 extends the monopoly rights for a drug by six 
months if it is tested in children. “The result is that drug companies now test their blockbusters, including drugs to 
treat primarily adult diseases like high blood pressure, in children, just because the extra protection is so lucrative.” 
Angell (2005, p. 182) 
5
 Refer to Table 2 for details. The commercial lifetime of patent for a drug refers to the number of years remaining 
in the drug’s patent term after clinical testing and FDA’s approval of the drug.  
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maximize the rents of those with access to the government decision-making process... [I]t 
means that the government will cartelize economic activity in favor of politically 
influential parties. In rare cases the government designs and enforces a set of rules of the 
game that encourage productive activity.” 
The $200-billion industry not only has access to the government’s decision-making process,6 but it is 
indeed so politically influential that “PhRMA [the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America], this lobby, has a death grip on Congress”, in the words of Senator Richard J. Durbin.7 This 
political influence potentially comes from the impressive amount of the industry’s lobbying expenditures 
and campaign contributions. For example, the industry’s total expenditure on lobbying from 1998 to 2006 
was $1,087 million, and total campaign contributions amount to $139 million during the election cycles 
from 1990 to 2006.8 In fact, given the nature of the industry, it is easy to understand that it is in the drug 
companies’ best interest to have access to the policymakers, who can easily return favors at low political 
costs. For a blockbuster (a drug that has sales of over a billion dollars a year), an extension of the patent’s 
effective lifetime for a few years could be extremely profitable given the usually negligible marginal cost 
of production for drugs.  
 The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis on this phenomenon by taking as a 
premise the hypothesis that campaign contributions are for the purpose of buying legislative influence. In 
particular, it incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth model to analyze the 
political-economic tradeoff facing the policymakers, who have to balance between the optimal level of 
patent protection to maximize social welfare on one hand and the interests of the special interest group 
                                                 
6
 The figure of $200 billion refers only to how much Americans spent on prescription drugs in 2002, and it does not 
include the other large expenses on drugs administered in hospitals, nursing homes, or doctors’ offices. Combining 
all these expenses, the industry’s revenue is roughly $400 billions in 2002. See, e.g. Angell (2005, p. 4-5). 
7
 Robert Pear, “Drug Companies Increase Spending on Efforts to Lobby Congress and Governments” New York 
Times, June 1, 2003. 
8
 These two figures are quoted in nominal terms. Refer to Table 1 for the detailed breakdown in real terms.  
 - 3 - 
(SIG) in exchange for campaign contributions on the other.9 It is analytically shown that the government 
placing a higher value on campaign contributions increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the amount of 
monopolistic profits; (c) the market value of patents; and (d) R&D investments. These results are 
consistent with the data in Section 2. Furthermore, this paper derives a unique level of the government’s 
bargaining power above which the amount of campaign contributions increases with respect to the weight 
that the government places on campaign contributions.  
In terms of welfare implications, it is not surprising and perhaps trivial that the presence of a SIG 
lobbying the government to distort the level of patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-
economy setting. However, in a multi-country setting, the presence of a SIG lobbying its own government 
in each country may improve social welfare because the level of patent protection in the multi-country 
Nash equilibrium without lobbying is suboptimally low due to the positive externality of international 
spillovers in innovations suggested by previous studies, such as Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and 
Qiu (2003). Therefore, the multi-country political equilibrium features an additional efficiency tradeoff 
between monopolistic distortion and the detrimental effects of international free-riding on innovations, 
and the finding of potential welfare gains arises from the SIGs increasing the level of patent protection 
from a globally suboptimal level and acting as an externality-correcting device. In addition, the 
pharmaceutical lobby may even improve the welfare of the consumers, who do not own any patent, when 
the degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough. Finally, this paper shows that if 
the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then the country, in which the government places a 
higher value on campaign contributions, would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss.  
 This paper relates to four strands of literature: (a) political economy of trade policy, (b) political 
economy and economic growth; (c) the welfare effects of lobbying; and (d) international patent 
protection. Feenstra (2004, chapter 9) provides a comprehensive discussion on the political economy of 
trade policy. An elegant formulation of special interest politics and trade policy is provided by Grossman 
                                                 
9
 This setup is motivated by Grossman and Helpman’s (2002, p. 5) insight that “[p]oliticians value contributions for 
their potential usefulness in financing campaigns, but many also wish to enact policies that benefit the public in 
order to improve their popularity among the well informed or to fulfill their sense of social responsibility.” 
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and Helpman (1994), who later develop a set of modeling tools on special interest politics in Grossman 
and Helpman (2001), from which this paper borrows to analyze patent policy. Drazen (2000, chapter 11) 
and Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14) provide a comprehensive discussion on political economy 
and economic growth. The literature has so far focused on the relations between economic growth and a 
number of issues, such as income inequality through redistributive policies, political institutions through 
property rights, and the adoption of new technology through the distribution of technological-vintage-
specific human capital. This paper provides a theoretical analysis on economic growth and the political 
economy of patent policy on one hand and analyzes the welfare effects of lobbying on the other. Recent 
studies on the welfare effects of lobbying, such as Besley and Coate (2001) and Coate and Morris (1999), 
analyze the negative effects of lobbying on social welfare arising from coordination failures between 
multiple SIGs, the excessive entry of citizens into running for office, and the implementation of Pareto 
dominated policies due to the fear of lobbying-driven hysteresis in policy decisions.  
 In the literature on international patent protection, Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu 
(2003) analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of 
the TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding growth model. In contrast, the current 
paper develops a multi-country quality-ladder growth model to analyze international patent protection and 
the political-economy aspects of patent policy. Dinopoulous et al (2005) analyze international patent 
protection using a North-South quality-ladder model. In their model, the level of patent protection is an 
exogenous parameter, and they are interested in the effects of patent protection on long-run growth and 
technology transfer; on the other hand, in the current paper, the level of patent protection is a policy 
instrument chosen by the government to maximize its objective function. Furthermore, the current paper 
incorporates special interest politics into the growth model to analyze the welfare implications of a 
pharmaceutical lobby. Lai (2005) extends the variety-expanding model in Grossman and Lai (2004) to 
analyze the effects of political contributions on the level of patent protection and shows insufficient patent 
protection prior to the TRIPS agreement. The current paper complements and extends Lai (2005) by 
taking insufficient patent protection as a starting point and by investigating whether the increasing 
 - 5 - 
political influence of the pharmaceutical lobby has improved social welfare. In addition, the current paper 
considers the welfare implications under both symmetric and asymmetric SIGs. 
 Before closing the introduction, I briefly discuss two common critiques against the hypothesis of 
campaign contributions as political investments. The first one is the small amount of campaign 
contributions relative to the potential financial returns at stake. Helpman and Persson (2001) provide an 
interesting model to show that a small amount of contributions does not necessarily imply that it has no 
effects on policy outcomes. In their model, lobbying has important influences on policy outcomes and the 
equilibrium amount of contributions is as small as zero because of the competition between legislators. 
The other common critique is that individuals are the main source of money in US campaigns. Based on 
this observation, Ansolabehere et al (2003) argue that campaign contributions should be considered as 
consumption goods rather than political investments. However, this argument does not rule out the 
possibility that SIGs contribute in order to influence the policymakers on certain policies. Ansolabehere et 
al (2003) write, “[a]lthough aggregate campaign expenditures primarily reflect consumption, it may be 
that a subset of donors, mainly corporate and industry PACs [political action committees], behave as if 
they expected favors in return. These contributors may in fact receive a reasonable rate of return – say 20 
percent…”  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts about the 
pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 describes the model and presents the theoretical results. The final 
section concludes. Some of the proofs are contained in Appendix A. 
 
2. SOME STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Table 1 indicates that the industry spends a large amount of money on lobbying each year and on 
campaign contributions during each election cycle. Another feature of the data is that lobbying 
expenditures in real terms have been rising rapidly at an average annual growth rate of 9.96%. Proposition 
2 suggests that this rising trend may be interpreted as an indication for the increasing importance of 
lobbying and campaign contributions that motivate the comparative static exercise in Section 3. 
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Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Lobbying expenditures 72.08 88.58 102.14 97.53 125.26 120.73 128.64 139.62 148.16
Election cycle 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Campaign contributions 3.97 9.17 8.54 14.67 13.65 26.69 28.30 16.48 16.64
Data source: opensecrets.org (http://www.opensecrets.org)
Footnotes: 
(b) Soft-money contributions were banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act following the 2002 
elections.
Table 1: Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical Industry
(in real 2000 US$ million)
(a) Campaign contributions include direct and soft-money contributions. Soft-money contributions to the national 
parties were not publicly disclosed until the 1991-92 election cycle. 
 
Table 2 presents the details of the extension in the commercial lifetime of patent and market 
exclusivity for drugs as a result of the policy changes during the 80’s and 90’s. Note that the effects 
captured in Table 2 underestimates the true extension of monopoly rights for brand-name drugs because 
they do not take into account the fact that the companies could strategically utilize the market exclusivity 
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act to protect a new generation of slightly-modified products.10 
Number of Years Added
Hatch-Waxman +2.3 years
PDUFA +2.1 years
URAA +1 year
FDAMA +0.5 year
Source: NIHCM (2000)
Footnotes: 
 (a) Hatch-Waxman: The Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
 (b) PDUFA: The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
 (c) URAA: The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
 (d) FDAMA: The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
Table 2: Extension in Commercial Lifetime of Patents and Market Exclusivity for Drugs
 
To summarize, the data presented so far is consistent with the hypothesis that the pharmaceutical industry 
has successfully exercised its political power, which comes from lobbying and campaign contributions, to 
influence the policymakers in order to strengthen patent protection for brand-name drugs. The next 
question is whether these policy changes have led to handsome financial returns for the industry. 
                                                 
10
 From NIHCM (2000), “…if a manufacturer timed the introduction of a new use, such as a more convenient dosing 
form, to coincide with the expiration of the ‘mother’ drug’s patent, it could have shielded the 13.9 to 15.4 years 
franchise of the drug for an additional three years, for as long as 17 to 18 years overall.” 
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 Indeed, they have. As Angell (2005, p. 3) writes, “[t]he watershed year was 1980. Before then, it 
was a good business, but afterward, it was a stupendous one.” Table 4 presents some financial time series 
for the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in Fortune 500 as an example. Each number in the table 
represents the annual average of the combined figures of the companies; for example, the first row 
presents the annual averages of the combined sales of the companies in the last decades. The data 
indicates that both sales and pretax income have been rising at a faster rate than the real GDP. Also, as a 
result of the stronger patent protection, the market value of pharmaceutical patents should have increased 
as well. A rough proxy for the value of patents owned by the companies is the value of intangible assets,11 
which has also risen substantially.  
Year 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05
Sales 13,714 31,878 49,433 100,886 180,901
Pretax Income 2,713 6,051 9,732 23,376 42,000
Intangible Assets 582 1,028 2,978 22,956 65,474
(a) According to CNNMoney.com, the Top 10 companies in 2006 are: Abbott Laboratories, Amgen, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Eli Lilly, Forest Laboratories, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Schering-Plough, and Wyeth.
(b) The figures do not include the data for Amgen because it does not have a complete time series for the above
years.
(c) For J&J, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, and Schering-Plough, intangible assets include both intangible assets and other assets
because intangible assets were included in other assets for some years.
(in real 2000 US$ million)
Table 3: Financial Figures of the Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies in Fortune 500
Data source: COMPUSTAT North America
Footnotes: 
 
 Motivated by the data presented above, the theoretical model in Section 3 attempts to achieve the 
following analytical results to confirm the basic intuition of the model. An increase in the value that the 
government places on campaign contributions in its objective function should lead to an extension in the 
patent length for brand-name drugs, and consequently an increase in the amount of monopolistic profits 
generated by the industry and the market value of patents. In addition, the model predicts that R&D 
investments on pharmaceuticals would increase. Table 4 shows that this is also true in the data. Private 
                                                 
11
 This proxy is a rough approximation at best for two reasons: (a) it includes other items, such as trade secrets, 
trademarks, and goodwill; and (b) the accounting valuation methods may not accurately reflect the market value. 
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R&D spending on drugs in real terms has been increasing at an average annual growth rate of 7.28% 
since the 80’s. 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
3,494 3,946 4,445 4,897 4,997 5,135 5,595 6,473 7,015 7,251 8,225
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
9,182 10,332 10,664 11,078 10,410 12,143 13,025 12,502 12,854 9,899 13,614
Data source: National Science Foundation - Division of Science Resources Statistics
Footnote: R&D is net of Federal spending.
Table 4: Private R&D Spending on Phamaceuticals and Medicines
(in real 2000 US$ million)
 
 
3. A QUALITY-LADDER GROWTH MODEL WITH SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 
The quality-ladder growth model originates from Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), in which scale effects are eliminated by assuming decreasing individual R&D productivity as in 
Segerstrom (1998).12 The basic framework is modified to introduce: (a) patent protection in the form of 
patent length; and (b) an organized SIG representing the owners of pharmaceutical patents. The model is 
further modified to include homogenous goods and quality-enhancing goods (i.e. pharmaceuticals).  
 Sections 3.1 – 3.4 firstly present the different components of the model in a closed-economy 
setting, and then the decentralized equilibrium is defined in Section 3.5. After characterizing the socially 
optimal patent length, lobbying is incorporated into the model by assuming that the government values 
campaign contributions in addition to social welfare. As a result, the SIG is able to distort the level of 
patent protection to benefit itself. The comparative static result shows that an increase in the importance 
of campaign contributions in the government’s objective function increases: (a) the patent length; (b) the 
amount of monopolistic profits; (c) the market value of patents; and (d) R&D investments. Finally, the 
different welfare implications of lobbying are derived under the closed-economy and multi-country 
settings with symmetric and asymmetric SIGs.  
                                                 
12
 See, e.g. Jones (1995a) and Jones (1999) for a discussion of scales effects in R&D-driven endogenous growth 
models. After eliminating scale effects, the resulting model becomes the so-called semi-endogenous growth model, 
in which the growth rate along the balanced-growth path is proportional to the labor-force growth rate. An increase 
in the share of R&D workers raises the level of technology while holding its balanced-growth rate constant. 
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3.1.   HOUSEHOLDS 
There is a continuum of households indexed by ]1,0[∈i , and their lifetime utility function is  
dticiceiU tqth
tn ))(ln)(()(
,,
0
)( βρ += ∫
∞
−−
.
13
 (1) 
)(
,
ic th  is the per capita consumption of homogenous goods, and it is chosen as the numeraire. β  is a 
preference parameter reflecting the importance of the per capita consumption of quality-enhancing goods, 
denoted by )(
,
ic tq . Each household has 
tn
t eL
.
=  members at time t, and 0>n  is the exogenous 
population growth rate. ρ  is the subjective discount rate. To ensure that utility is bounded,  
n>ρ . (A1) 
Each household maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints  
)()()()()(
,,,
icPicwianria tqtqthtttt −−+−=& . (2) 
Each member of a household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn a 
wage income tw . tr  is the real rate of return on the financial assets, which represent the market value of 
patents in equilibrium. Each household ]1,0[∈i  belongs to either of two types },{ III∈ . Type-I 
household ],0[ θ∈i  and Type-II household ]1,(θ∈i  differ in their investment opportunity sets.  
 
Assumption 1: Type-I households have access to the financial market while Type-II households are 
restricted from participating in the financial market such that 0)( =IIat .14 
 
                                                 
13
 The quasi-linear preference enables me to derive the patent length in the political equilibrium with a minimal 
assumption of efficient bargaining between the government and the SIG. 
14
 In this setting, the identity of the two types of households is exogenously imposed. In fact, this identity can be 
endogenously derived by assuming an exogenous difference in the discount rates across the two types of households 
along with a borrowing constraint. Then, the households who have a lower discount rate would be the owners of 
financial assets in equilibrium.  
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This setup leads to a conflict of interest between the patent owners (i.e. Type-I households) who benefit 
from an increase in the rate of return on R&D investments and the consumers (i.e. Type-II households) 
who don’t, and this conflict of interest gives rise to the importance of political economics. 
 From Type-I households’ intertemporal optimization, the Euler equation derived from the quasi-
linear preference equates the rate of return on financial assets to the subjective discount rate such that  
ρ=tr . (3) 
The intratemporal optimality condition determines the amount of spending on the quality-enhancing 
goods in each period to be  
β=)(
,,
icP tqtq  (4) 
for },{ IIIi ∈ . Since both types of households consume the same amount of quality-enhancing goods, 
notation simplifies to )(
,,
icc tqtq ≡ . Aggregate consumption of pharmaceuticals tqttq cLC ,, =  is a 
standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator of a continuum of differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods 
]1,0[∈j  (i.e. differentiated drugs). The production function is given by  








= ∫
1
0
,,
)(lnexp djjYY tqtq , (5) 
and the familiar aggregate price index is  








= ∫
1
0
,,
)(lnexp djjPP tqtq . (6) 
The first-order condition for differentiated drug ]1,0[∈j  is 
tqtqtqtq CPjYjP ,,,, )()( = . (7) 
 
3.2.   HOMOGENOUS GOODS 
There exists a larger number of competitive firms producing the homogenous goods thY , . The production 
function has constant returns to scale in labor input thL ,  given by   
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thth LY ,, .α= . (8) 
The marginal cost of production is  
α/
, tth wMC = . (9) 
Since the homogenous goods are chosen to be the numeraire and this sector is characterized by marginal-
cost pricing, the marginal cost is also one. Therefore, the real wage is given by α=tw , and the market-
clearing condition is  
))()1()((
,,,, .
IIcIcLCY ththtthth θθ −+== , (10) 
where thC ,  is the total consumption of homogenous goods.  
 
3.3.   THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Within the pharmaceutical industry, there is a continuum of sub-industries on the unit interval producing 
differentiated drugs. Each sub-industry ],0[ tj ω∈  is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader, who 
holds a valid patent on the latest technology, and each sub-industry ]1,(
.tj ω∈  is characterized by perfect 
competition because the most recent patent has expired. tω  is endogenously determined by the patent 
length chosen by the government. The following formulation of patent length is originally developed by 
Grossman and Lai (2004) for a variety-expanding model and subsequently modified by Dinopoulos et al 
(2005) for a quality-ladder model. In standard quality-ladder models, a patent’s effective lifetime ends 
when a higher level of technology is invented in the same industry. As in Dinopoulos et al (2005), I 
assume that a monopolistic leader can maintain its monopoly position until the end of the statutory patent 
life, denoted by T . This assumption is especially relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, in which the 
effective patent life for drugs usually coincides with the statutory patent life.15 
 
                                                 
15
 In this case, the statutory patent life refers to the patent length granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office as 
well as the length of exclusive marketing rights granted by the FDA. 
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Assumption 2: Entrepreneurs can only invest in R&D to develop a better drug after the latest patent in 
the sub-industry has expired. 
 
 When a patent expires, the monopolistic sub-industry temporarily becomes a generic sub-industry 
characterized by marginal-cost pricing until the next innovation occurs. Therefore, extending the statutory 
patent life has two opposing effects on social welfare. On one hand, it enhances the incentives for R&D 
by raising the present value of the stream of profits earned by a monopolistic leader. On the other hand, it 
increases the dead weight loss by increasing the fraction of monopolistic sub-industries due to a longer 
period of patent protection. At the constrained social optimum, the government balances these opposing 
effects to maximize social welfare.  
 The production function in sub-industry j is  
)()(
,
)(
,
jLzjY tqjmtq t= . (11) 
)(
,
jL tq  is the number of workers hired by sub-industry j at time t. )( jmtz  is the monopolistic leader’s 
marginal product of labor, which is increasing over time due to technological improvement. 1>z  is the 
exogenous step-size of productivity improvement arising from each innovation. )( jmt , which is an 
integer, is the number of innovations that has occurred in sub-industry j as of time t. The marginal cost of 
production is  
)(
,
/)( jmttq tzwjMC = . (12) 
For a monopolistic sub-industry ],0[
. t
j ω∈ , the price-setting behavior is governed by the closet rival’s 
marginal cost of production 1)(/ −jmt tzw . The familiar Bertrand-equilibrium price is 
)(
,,
/)()(
.
jm
tqtq
tzzjMCzjP α== . (13) 
Thus, the monopolistic leader charges a markup of z  over the marginal cost, and the equilibrium profit is 
)()1()()()1()(
,,,, .
jLzjYjMCzj tqtqtqtq αpi −=−= . (14) 
 - 13 - 
In equilibrium, )(
,
jL tq  is the same across ],0[ tj ω∈  because of the Cobb-Douglas specification in (5), 
so that )(
,
jtqpi  is also the same across ],0[ tj ω∈ . 
 Substituting (11) into (5), the aggregate production function for pharmaceuticals becomes  
e
tqttq LAY ,, = . (15) 








= ∫
1
0
,,
)(lnexp djjLL tqe tq  is an index of effective labor inputs,16 and 






= ∫ zdjjmA tt ln)(exp
1
0
 is the 
aggregate level of technology for pharmaceuticals. Without loss of generality, the sub-industries are 
ordered such that j is monopolistic for ],0[ tj ω∈  and j′  is generic for ]1,( .tj ω∈′ . Substituting (13) 
into (6), the aggregate price index for pharmaceuticals becomes  
ttq AzP t /, α
ω
= . (16) 
Substituting (16) into (4) and multiplying by tL , aggregate consumption of pharmaceuticals becomes  
)/)(/(
.,
αβω tttq LzAC t= . (17) 
tqC ,  decreases in tω  reflecting the markup-pricing distortion and increases over time due to tA  reflecting 
technological improvements. Using (15) and (17), the index of effective labor inputs becomes 
)/(
.,
αβ ωtzLL te tq = . The first-order condition from (7) implies that the ratio of relative labor inputs in the 
monopolistic and generic sub-industries is zjLjL tqtq =′ )(/)( ,, . Therefore, the index of effective labor 
inputs can be re-expressed as )(
,
1
,
jLzL tqe tq tω−= , and the number of workers in monopolistic sub-industry 
j is )/()(
.,
αβ zLjL ttq = . Substituting this condition into (14) yields  
ttq L
z
zj
.
1)(
,
βpi 




 −
= , (18) 
                                                 
16
 This index is different from the actual number of workers in the pharmaceutical industry because the number of 
workers varies across sub-industries in the present model as a result of the presence of both monopolistic and 
generic sub-industries. 
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which is the same across all monopolistic sub-industries and increases over time as the total population 
grows. The total amount of monopolistic profit is 
tttqtq L
z
zdjj
t
.
1)(
0
,,
βωpipi
ω





 −
== ∫ . (19) 
Finally, the actual number of workers employed in the pharmaceutical industry is  
α
βωω
ωω ttttqttqttq
L
z
zjLjLL .)1()()1()(
,,,





 −+
=′−+= , (20) 
which increases over time at the population growth rate. 
 
3.4.   R&D 
The no-arbitrage value of a pharmaceutical patent tV  for a new successful innovation at time t  is the 
present value of the stream of profits earned by the R&D entrepreneur who becomes the next industry 
leader until the patent expires. From (19), 
tq
Tt
t
t
t L
z
z
n
TdjeV
.
1)()(
,
)( βρτpi ττ
τρ





 −
−
Ω
=′= ∫
+
=
−−
 (21) 
where ))(exp(1)( TnT −−−≡Ω ρ  has the properties of 0)0( =Ω , 1)( =∞Ω , and 0)( >Ω′ T .  
 The Poisson arrival rate )(ktλ  of a successful innovation for an R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈k  is a 
function of labor inputs given by  
)()(
,
kLk trtt ϕλ = , (22) 
where tϕ  is the individual R&D productivity parameter that the entrepreneur takes as given. The R&D 
sector is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The expected profit earned by 
entrepreneur k is  
)()()(
,,
kLwkVk trttttr −= λpi . (23) 
The first-order condition is  
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αϕ =ttV , (24) 
which is the key condition that determines the number workers allocated to the R&D sector. 
To eliminate scale effects, the individual R&D productivity parameter tϕ  at time t  is assumed to 
be decreasing in the level of technology tA  such that  
φ
γϕϕ
−
−
= 1
1
,.
t
tr
t A
L
, (25) 
where ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dkkLL trtr . )1,(−∞∈φ  captures the externality of intertemporal knowledge spillovers,17 
and ]1,0(∈γ  captures the intratemporal negative congestion externality or the so-called “stepping on 
toes” effects. The law of motion for pharmaceutical technology is  
zLAzLAzAA trttrttttt lnlnln ,, ϕϕλ γφ===& .18 (26) 
 
3.5.   DECENTRALIZED EQUILIBRIUM 
The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞
=0,, )}(),(,,,{ ttqtqttt jMCjPVrw  and a sequence of allocations 
∞
=0,,,,,, }),(),(),(),(),(),({ tthtrtqtqtqtht LkLjLjYicicIa  that are consistent with the initial conditions 
},,{ 000 ϕAL  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also,  
(a) each Type-I household chooses )}(),(),({
,,
IcIcIa tqtht  and supplies labor to maximize utility 
taking )}(,,{
,
jPrw tqtt  as given;  
                                                 
17
 As discussed in Jones (1995b), )1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing on shoulder” effect, in which aggregate 
R&D productivity ϕqA  increases as the level of technology increases (see the law of motion for technology). On 
the other hand, )0,(−∞∈φ  corresponds to the “fishing out” effect, in which early technology is relatively easy to 
develop and ϕqA  decreases as the level of technology increases.  
18
 This expression is derived as zdzdjjmdjzA
t
t
t
t
jm ln)(ln)(lnln
0
1
0
1
0
)(













∫=∫=∫= ττλ ; then, differentiation with 
respect to time yields zAA ttt ln/ λ=& . 
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(b) each Type-II household chooses )}(),({
,,
IIcIIc tqth  and supplies labor to maximize utility taking 
)}(,{
,
jPw tqt  as given;  
(c) competitive firms in the homogenous-goods sector chooses }{
,thL  to maximize profits according 
to the production function taking }{ tw  as given; 
(d) each monopolistic leader in pharmaceutical sub-industry ],0[ tj ω∈  chooses )}(),({ ,, jLjP tqtq  
to maximize profits according to the Bertrand price competition and its production function 
taking )}(),({
,,
jYjMC tqtq  as given;  
(e) competitive firms in pharmaceutical sub-industry ]1,(
.tj ω∈  choose )}({ , jL tq  to maximize 
profits according to the production function taking )}(),(),({
,,,
jYjMCjP tqtqtq  as given;  
(f) each entrepreneur ]1,0[∈k  in the R&D sector chooses )}({
,
kL tr  to maximize profits according 
to the production function taking },,{ ttt Vw ϕ  as given;  
(g) The market for the homogenous goods clears such that thth CY ,, = ; 
(h) The market for pharmaceuticals clears such that tqtq CY ,, = ; and 
(i) The labor market clears such that ttrtqth LLLL =++ ,,, . 
 
3.6.   BALANCED-GROWTH PATH 
Along the balanced-growth path, trL ,  increases at the population growth rate (to be shown below). 
Therefore, the balanced-growth rate of technology for pharmaceuticals denoted by g  must be 
proportional to the population growth rate such that 
nz
A
L
A
Ag
t
tr
t
t
φ
γϕφ
γ
−
==≡
− 1
ln1
,
&
. (27) 
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Then, the steady-state Poisson arrival rate of innovations is zg ln/=λ . The fraction of monopolistic 
sub-industries at time t is the sum of all inventions from the last T periods  
τλω τ∫ −=
T
tt d
0
. (28) 
Therefore, the steady-state value of 
.
ω  is simply λT . To ensure that ]1,0(
.
∈ω , an upper bound given by 
γ
φλ
n
zT ln)1(/1 −=≤  (A2) 
is imposed on the patent length.  
 Solving the first-order condition (24) from the R&D sector and imposing the balanced-growth 
condition yield the steady-state share of workers in the R&D sector given by  
α
β
ρ
λ 




 −
−
Ω
=
z
z
n
T
sr
1)(
. (29) 
Substituting (20) and (29) into 1=++ rqh sss  closes the model by solving for the steady-state share of 
workers in the homogenous-goods sector given by 











 −
−
Ω
+
−+
−=
z
z
n
T
z
zTT
sh
1)()1(1
ρ
λλλ
α
β
. (30) 
The per capita supply of homogenous goods is  











 −
−
Ω
+
−+
−=
z
z
n
T
z
zTT
sh
1)()1(
. ρ
λλλβαα . (31) 
From the budget constraints, the steady-state per capita consumption of homogenous goods is 
β
ρθ
λβαρ 




 −






−
Ω
−+−=−+−=
z
z
n
TTIancPwIc qqh
1)()()()( , (32) 
βα −=−= qqh cPwIIc )( . (33) 
Therefore, the following parameter restriction is sufficient to ensure an interior solution for both types of 
households 
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βα > . (A3) 
)()( Ian−ρ  is the amount of dividends received by each member of Type-I households, and the total 
value of financial assets owned by Type-I households equals the market value of all existing patents. 
From (21), the market value of a pharmaceutical patent that has a remaining life time of τ  years is 
tt L
z
z
n
V
.
1)()( β
ρ
τ
τ 




 −
−
Ω
= . (34) 
Therefore, the market value of all existing patents in the monopolistic industries is 
n
L
z
zddV
T
t
TT
t
−





 −








Ω= ∫∫
==
ρ
β
ττλττω
ττ
.
1)()(
00
, (35) 
where 





−
Ω
−=







Ω∫
=
n
TTd
T
ρ
ττ
τ
)()(
0
.   
 To see the conflict of interests across the two types of households, differentiating )(Ich  and 
)(IIch  with respect to T  yields  
01)(1)( >




 −






−
Ω′
−=
∂
∂ β
ρθ
λ
z
z
n
T
T
Ich
, (36) 
0)( =
∂
∂
T
IIch
. (37) 
Note that ))()(exp()( nTnT −−−=Ω′ ρρ . An increase in T has three effects on the welfare of each 
household. (36) and (37) indicate the asymmetric effect coming from the increase in the value of patents 
that benefits only the patent owners. The two symmetric effects as shown in (17) are the negative effect of 
markup-pricing distortion and the positive effect of a higher level of pharmaceutical technology.  
 
3.7.   DESIRED PATENT LENGTHS FOR PATENT OWNERS AND CONSUMERS 
Given the equilibrium conditions, the lifetime utility for each type of households along the balanced 
growth path can be derived by rewriting (1) into 
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dttge
n
TcTic
TiU tnqh )()(ln),(),(
.
0
)(0,
∫
∞
−−+
−
+
=
ρ
ρ
β
,
19
 (38) 
for },{ IIIi ∈ . ),( TIch  is a function of T because an increase in patent length raises the value of 
dividends that increases the consumption of the patent owners. From (17),  
)/ln(ln)(ln)(ln 00, αβλ +−= zTTATcq . (39) 
zT lnλ  is a function of T  because an increase in T worsens the markup-pricing distortion by increasing 
the fraction of monopolistic sub-industries. )(ln 0 TA  is a function of T because an increase in T enhances 
the incentives for R&D, which in turn raises the level of technology for pharmaceuticals. From (27),  
)(ln)( )1/(0,
)1/(1
0 TLg
zTA r
φγ
φϕ
−
−






= . (40) 
dttge tni )(
.
0
)(
∫
∞
−− ρ
 represents the balanced growth path of tA  and is independent of T because of the semi-
endogenous growth formulation. Substituting (29), (39) and (40) into (38) and dropping some constant 
terms and the exogenous growth path, the lifetime utility can be further simplified to  






−Ω





−
+−= − zTTTicnTiU h ln)(ln1),()(),( .
1 λβφ
γβρ  (41) 
for },{ IIIi ∈ . Therefore, the first-order condition that characterizes the desired patent length is 
0ln)(
)(
1
),()(),(
.
1
=





−
Ω
Ω′






−
+
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
− z
T
T
T
Tic
n
T
TiU h λβφ
γβρ  (42) 
for },{ IIIi ∈ . Denoted the solution to (42) by *iT  for },{ IIIi ∈ .  
 
Lemma 1: ** III TT > . 
Proof: Note that 0),(),( =
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
T
TIIc
T
TIc hh
 from (36) and (37).              □ 
                                                 
19
 The conclusion briefly discusses the generality of a steady-state welfare analysis that ignores transition dynamics. 
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Intuitively, the patent owners have a longer desired patent length than the consumers because of the 
asymmetric ownership of patents as financial assets whose market value increases in patent length. This 
setup leads to a conflict of interest across the two types of households and gives rise to the potential role 
of the pharmaceutical lobby influencing the government’s policy choice through campaign contributions. 
 
3.8.   OPTIMAL PATENT LENGTH 
A benevolent government chooses the patent length to maximize social welfare subject to the equilibrium 
conditions. Social welfare is defined as  
),()1(),(),()(
.
1
0
TIIUTIUdiTiUTW θθ −+=≡ ∫ . (43) 
The first-order condition that characterizes the optimal patent length is  
0),()1(),()( =
∂
∂
−+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
T
TIIU
T
TIU
T
TW θθ . (44) 
Denote the solution to (44) by *T . The second-order condition at the social optimum is  
0)(
1
ln
1
1
)()( 2**2
*2
.
=
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
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. (45) 
The sign of (45) is given by  






Ω
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


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.. Tzz
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n
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T
TW
sign ρ . (46) 
To ensure that the second-order condition is satisfied for a maximum, the following assumption is 
imposed on the parameter values  
n
n
z
zz
−
>





− ρ
.
1
ln
. (A4) 
This assumption rules out the possibility that an increase in T  would increase ),( TIch  by so much that 
*T  is unbounded. Comparing with (42), (44) is simply a weighted average of the first-order conditions 
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for the two types of households. The larger is θ , the closer *T  is to *IT , and vice versa. Lemma 2 
summarizes these findings.  
 
Lemma 2: ),( *** III TTT ∈  and 0/* >∂∂ θT  for )1,0(∈θ . 
Proof: Note (42) and (44).                   □  
 
3.9.   CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
This subsection employs the modeling tools in Grossman and Helpman (2001, chapter 7) to model 
campaign contributions for legislative influence. In addition to social welfare, the government is assumed 
to value campaign contributions, denoted by 0C , and its objective function is a weighted average of 
)(TW  and 0C  given by  
00 .)()1(),(
~ CTWCTW ςς +−≡ .20 (47) 
]1,0(∈ς  is the weight that the government places on campaign contributions. The pharmaceutical lobby 
and the government are assumed to engage in efficient bargaining and be able to commit to the bargaining 
outcome on patent length and campaign contributions. The quasi-linear preference enables me to derive 
the political-equilibrium patent length without imposing further assumptions on the bargaining process.21 
The efficient bargaining outcome on the patent length can be derived from the constrained maximization 
problem ),(~ 0
, 0
CTWMax
CT
 subject to UCTIU ˆ),( 0. ≥−θ  for some value of Uˆ . It is in the government’s 
best interest to choose the highest possible 0C  to make this inequality constraint binding. Therefore, the 
constraint can be re-expressed as  
UTIUC ˆ),(.0 −= θ . (48) 
                                                 
20
 Grossman and Helpman (2001, chapter 10) and (2002, chapter 2) show that this objective function represents a 
proper reduced form of a model with electoral competition. 
21
 Although the political-equilibrium patent length can be determined, the amount of campaign contributions cannot 
be determined unless further assumptions are imposed on the bargaining process. See Proposition 2. 
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After substituting (48) into (47) and dropping the constant term, the constrained maximization becomes  
),()1)(1(),()(~
.
TIIUTIUTWMax
T
θςθ −−+= . (49) 
In other words, when the government values campaign contributions, the pharmaceutical lobby is able to 
alter the relative weight that the government places on the households’ welfare. In particular, a higher 
value that the government places on campaign contributions leads to a larger relative weight that the 
government places on Type-I households’ welfare. The first-order condition that characterizes the 
political-equilibrium patent length, denoted by )(ςSIGT , is  
0),()1)(1(),()(
~
=
∂
∂
−−+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
T
TIIU
T
TIU
T
TW θςθ . (50) 
Comparing (44) and (50), *)( TT SIG >ς  for ]1,0(∈ς  and 0/)( >∂∂ ςςSIGT . As the government places 
a larger weight on campaign contributions, it chooses a longer patent length. As a result, the amount of 
monopolistic profits generated by the pharmaceutical industry and the value of pharmaceutical patents 
also increase. This leads to an increase in R&D investments, reflected by an increase in the fraction of 
workers in the R&D sector. Proposition 1 summarizes these results. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in ς  leads to an increase in: (a) SIGT ; (b) qpi ; (c) V ; and (d) rs . 
Proof: For (a), note (50). Then, recall from (28) that 0/ >=∂∂ λω T . For (b), note (19). For (c), note 
(21). For (d), note (29).                    □  
 
Determining the impact of ς  on the equilibrium amount of campaign contributions requires an 
additional assumption on the bargaining outcome between the government and the pharmaceutical lobby.  
 
Assumption 3: The government and the pharmaceutical lobby maximizes the total surplus, and the 
constant share of total surplus captured by the government is ]1,0[∈σ .  
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Proposition 2: There exists a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς . 
Proof: See Appendix A.                   □  
 
Corollary 1a: The government having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
SIG is equivalent to 1=σ . In this case, )),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC SIG −= θ  and 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς .  
Proof: See Appendix A.                   □  
 
Corollary 1b: The SIG having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
government is equivalent to 0=σ . In this case, ςς /)1))(()(( *0 −−= SIGTWTWC  and 0/ .0 <∂∂ ςC  
for )1,0(∈ς .  
Proof: See Appendix A.                   □  
 
Intuitively, whether the amount of campaign contributions increases or decreases in response to a larger 
ς  depends on the relative bargaining power between the government and the SIG. When the government 
has all the bargaining power (i.e. 1=σ ), it is able to extract all the surplus from the SIG, and hence, 
0/0 >∂∂ ςC . Similarly, when the SIG has all the bargaining power (i.e. 0=σ ), it contributes the 
smallest amount possible in order to make the government indifferent between SIGT  and *T . 
 
3.10.   WELFARE ANALYSIS IN CLOSED VS. OPEN ECONOMY 
Grossman and Lai (2004) and Lai and Qiu (2003) show that the Nash-equilibrium level of patent 
protection in a multi-country setting is suboptimally low because each country has the incentive to free 
ride on other countries’ innovations. Therefore, when all countries act according to their best response 
functions in choosing the level of patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium patent length is much shorter 
than the global optimum. This is a realistic description of the real world because innovations occur 
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worldwide. At least, innovations come from multiple industrial countries. Therefore, the closed-economy 
setting is now extended to a multi-country setting in order to compare the different welfare implications. 
The theoretical result is that the pharmaceutical lobbies may improve social welfare in the multi-country 
setting by increasing the patent length from a globally suboptimal level. 
 There are N symmetric countries. For simplicity, transportation costs are assumed to be zero, and 
there is no international lending and borrowing as commonly assumed in the literature to pin down a 
unique trade pattern. When an R&D entrepreneur has an innovation success, she obtains a patent in each 
country. Therefore, in addition to the stream of monopolistic profits from the domestic economy, she is 
also entitled to the profits from abroad. At the aggregate level, these transfers of monopolistic profits for 
patent services are balanced by an equal value of trade in homogenous goods. The symmetry assumption 
implies that each country owns an equal fraction of patented innovations in the world.  
 The two equilibrium concepts for the open-economy model are as follows.  
1. Nash Equilibrium. In the absence of lobbying, the benevolent government in each country chooses the 
patent length to maximize the welfare of its own citizens taking the level of patent protection abroad as 
given. The resulting first-order condition for each country },...,1{ Ns ∈  is a social best response function 
given by  
0),...,,()1(),...,,(),...,(
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=
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s
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s
Ns
T
TTIIU
T
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TTW θθ  (51) 
 (i.e. the multi-country analog of (44)), and the Nash equilibrium is the solution of the social best 
response functions of all countries.  
2. Political Equilibrium. In the presence of lobbying, the SIG in each country is assumed to lobby its 
own government taking the action of the SIGs in other countries as given. The resulting first-order 
condition for each country },...,1{ Ns ∈  is a SIG best response function given by  
0),...,,()1)(1(),...,,(),...,(
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 - 25 - 
 (i.e. the multi-country analog of (50)), and the political equilibrium is the solution of the SIG best 
response functions of all countries. 
 The followings sketch out the key equations of the multi-country model. The no-arbitrage value 
of a patent is the present value of the stream of monopolistic profits from all countries },...,1{ Ns ∈ . 
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. (53) 
The statutory patent length in country s is denoted by sT . In the Nash equilibrium, sT  is the same across 
countries because of symmetry. The law of motion for technology is 
zLAA
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trttt ln
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ϕ& . (54) 
The first implicit assumption behind (54) is that each country has the immediate access to the 
technological innovations from abroad, and this is a reasonable assumption because the inventors have the 
incentive to patent their innovations internationally. The second assumption is that technological 
innovations across countries are perfect substitutes because of the identical households’ preferences 
across countries, and this is likely to be a reasonable description of the demand for pharmaceuticals in 
industrial countries. The first-order condition from the R&D sector becomes  
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Using the balanced-growth path condition, the multi-country analog of (40) is 
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(55) and (56) reveal one of the two key differences between the closed-economy model and the multi-
country model in which a unilateral increase in sT  leads to a much smaller percentage increase in 
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 and consequently a much smaller percentage increase in ),...,( 10 NTTA . The market 
value of all existing patents in the global economy at time t is  
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Therefore, the amount of dividends received by each member of Type-I households in country s is  
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The derivative of ),...,,( 1 Nsh TTIc  with respect to sT  is given by  
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which reveals the other key difference that an unilateral increase in sT  has a smaller impact on domestic 
consumption because a large fraction of the increase in monopolistic profits is accrued to foreigners.  
The social best response function (51) of country },...,1{ Ns ∈  becomes   
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By imposing symmetry, the condition that characterizes the symmetric Nash-equilibrium patent length 
NET  simplifies to  
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Lemma 3: The Nash-equilibrium patent length is decreasing in N and is strictly below the symmetric 
globally optimal patent length when the number of countries is at least two. 
Proof: See Appendix A.                    □ 
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In the case of special interest politics, the SIG best response function (52) of country 
},...,1{ Ns ∈  becomes   
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The condition that characterizes the symmetric political-equilibrium patent length SIGT  simplifies to  
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Proposition 3: When 1=N , )()( *TWTW SIG <   for ]1,0(∈ς . When 2≥N , there exists a ςˆ  such 
that for ]ˆ,0( ςς ∈ , )()( NEsSIGs TWTW > , and ςˆ  is increasing in N . Furthermore, for any given 
)1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N~  such that if NN ~≥ , ),(),( NEsSIGs TIIUTIIU > . 
Proof: See Appendix A.                   □ 
 
Proposition 3 shows that the pharmaceutical lobbies may improve social welfare when the level of patent 
protection is not chosen optimally by the government such as in the case of a multi-country Nash 
equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition of Proposition 3 in a two-country setting. Furthermore, the 
pharmaceutical lobby may even improve the welfare of the consumers (i.e. Type-II households) when the 
degree of international free-riding on innovations is severe enough.  
 Proposition 3 also shows that in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may 
improve the social welfare of each country. However, if the SIGs have asymmetric influences across 
countries, then the country, in which the government places a higher value on campaign contributions, 
would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Proposition 
4 proves this statement in a two-country setting.  
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Proposition 4: Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium with 021 >== ςςς ) , both countries 
are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, there must exist a ),0( ςς )(∈  such that 
when ςς )=1  and ],0[2 ςς (∈ , country 1 is worse off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes 
that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry’s political 
influence, which potentially comes from lobbying and campaign contributions. This paper incorporates 
special interest politics into a quality-ladder growth model to analyze the policymakers’ tradeoff between 
the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the 
presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting the level of patent protection is socially undesirable in a 
closed-economy setting. However, in a multi-country setting, the presence of a symmetric SIG may 
improve the social welfare of each country. If the SIGs have asymmetric influences across countries, then 
the country that has a more politically influential SIG would gain by less or even suffer a welfare loss. It 
remains as an empirical question as to whether the pharmaceutical lobby in the US is more or less 
politically influential than its foreign counterparts. 
 Before closing the paper, I briefly discuss the generality of the steady-state welfare analysis. The 
transition dynamics is omitted for analytical tractability; however, the theoretical predictions should be 
robust for two reasons. Firstly, the government may want to maximize social welfare that includes the 
transition dynamics. So long as there is a positive externality in patent protection, the Nash-equilibrium 
patent length is globally suboptimal. Thus, an increase in patent length due to political influences may 
still improve social welfare. Secondly, the resource reallocation from production to R&D as a result of 
increasing patent protection does not necessarily lead to short-run consumption losses.22 In this case, 
improving steady-state welfare would be sufficient to improve social welfare.  
                                                 
22
 E.g. Chu (2007) shows that this result holds true over a range of parameters in a model with capital accumulation. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proposition 2: There exists a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς . 
 
Proof: The welfare of the government is firstly rescaled so that one dollar for the government has the 
same utility weight as one dollar for the SIG. Dividing (47) by ς , 
00 /)1)((/),(
~ CTWCTW +−= ςςς . (a1) 
The total surplus of the government and the SIG at SIGT  is  
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.
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Differentiating (a2) with respect to T  yields 
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Multiplying (a3) by ς  and substituting (44) into (a3) yields the same first-order condition as (50). From 
Assumption 3, the amount of surplus captured by the government is TS
.
σ  such that 
TSCTWTW SIG
.0
* /)1)](()([ σςς =+−− . (a4) 
Rearranging some terms, (a4) becomes 
)],(),([/)1)](()()[1( **0 . TIUTIUTWTWC SIGSIG −+−−−= σθςςσ . (a5) 
Differentiating (a5) with respect to ς  yields 
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Note that 0)()( * >− SIGTWTW , 0/)( <∂∂ ςSIGTW , and 0/),( >∂∂ ςSIGTIU . The next step is to 
show that there exists a unique )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that 0/
ˆ
0 =∂∂ =σσςC . I will show this in three steps: (i) 
0/
.0
2 >∂∂∂ σςC ; (ii) 0/ 00 <∂∂ =σςC ; and (iii) 0/ 10 >∂∂ =σςC . 
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Note that 0/)()1(/)]()([ * >∂∂−+− ςςς SIGSIG TWTWTW  because )1(/1 ςς −>  for )1,0(∈ς  and 
ς∂−∂>− /)()]()([ * SIGSIG TWTWTW . 
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Thus, there must exist a )1,0(ˆ ∈σ  such that if and only if σσ ˆ≥ , 0/0 ≥∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς .               □ 
 
Corollary 1a: The government having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
SIG is equivalent to 1=σ . In this case, )),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC SIG −= θ  and 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς . 
 
Proof: At the social optimum *T , the welfare of the SIG is  
),( *
.
TIUθ . (a10) 
In the political equilibrium },{ 0CT SIG , the welfare of the SIG is  
0),(. CTIU SIG −θ . (a11) 
Therefore, the maximum amount that the SIG is willing to pay as campaign contributions is the amount 
for which it is indifferent between }0,{},{ *0 TCT =  and ))},(),((,{},{ *0 TIUTIUTCT SIGSIG −= θ . 
Therefore, the participation constraint is  
)),(),(( *0 TIUTIUC SIG −≤ θ . (a12) 
Since the government has the first-mover advantage, it would make an offer to the SIG such that the 
participation constraint is binding. Note that setting 1=σ  in (a5) yields  
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)],(),([ *0 . TIUTIUC SIG −= θ . (a13) 
Therefore, 1=σ  is equivalent to the case in which the government has the first-mover advantage to 
make a take-or-leave-it offer to the SIG. In this case, 0/0 >∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς  as shown in (a9).         □  
 
Corollary 1b: The SIG having the first-mover advantage to make a take-or-leave-it offer to the 
government is equivalent to 0=σ . In this case, ςς /)1))(()(( *0 −−= SIGTWTWC  and 0/ .0 <∂∂ ςC  
for )1,0(∈ς .  
 
Proof: At the social optimum *T , the welfare of the government is  
ςς /)1)(( * −TW . (a14) 
In the political equilibrium },{ 0CT SIG , the welfare of the government is  
0/)1)(( CTW SIG +− ςς . (a15) 
Therefore, the minimum amount that the government is willing to accept as campaign contributions to 
implement SIGT  is the amount for which it is indifferent between }0,{},{ *0 TCT =  and 
}/)1)](()([,{},{ *0 ςς−−= SIGSIG TWTWTCT . Therefore, the participation constraint is  
ςς /)1)](()([ *0 −−≥ SIGTWTWC . (a16) 
Since the SIG has the first-mover advantage, it would make an offer to the government such that the 
participation constraint is binding. Note that setting 0=σ  in (a5) yields  
ςς /)1)](()([ *0 −−= SIGTWTWC . (a17) 
Therefore, 0=σ  is equivalent to the case in which the SIG has the first-mover advantage to make a take-
or-leave-it offer to the government. In this case, 0/0 <∂∂ ςC  for )1,0(∈ς  as shown in (a8).               □  
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Lemma 3: The Nash-equilibrium patent length is decreasing in N and is strictly below the symmetric 
globally optimal patent length when the number of countries is at least two. 
 
Proof: Recall that NET  is characterized by  
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Taking the total differentials of (a18), 
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negative by (A4). The symmetric globally optimal patent length, denoted by GOT , is characterized by  
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Therefore, for 2≥N , GONE TT < .    □ 
 
Proposition 3: When 1=N , )()( *TWTW SIG <   for ]1,0(∈ς . When 2≥N , there exists a ςˆ  such 
that for ]ˆ,0( ςς ∈ , )()( NEsSIGs TWTW > , and ςˆ  is increasing in N . Furthermore, for any given 
)1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N~  such that if NN ~≥ , ),(),( NEsSIGs TIIUTIIU > . 
 
Proof: Recall that the symmetric SIG patent length SIGT  is characterized by 
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Equating (a19) and (a20) yields 
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where GOT  is determined by (a19) and is independent of N . Denote the value of ς  that solves (a21) by 
ςˆ . When 1=N , ςˆ  must equal zero for (a21) to hold. When 2≥N , 0ˆ >ς  and 0/ˆ >∂∂ Nς . Note that 
when ςς ˆ> , it is not necessarily true that )()( NEsSIGs TWTW < . In this case, it simply involves the 
comparison of two globally suboptimal levels of patent protection NET  and )(ςSIGT . 
 To show that even Type-II households may benefit from the pharmaceutical lobbies, (42) implies 
that the symmetric desired patent length for Type-II households is given by 
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Equating (a22) and (a18) yields 
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The left-hand side is increasing in N while the right-hand side is decreasing is decreasing in N. Therefore, 
there exists a unique N for which the Nash-equilibrium patent length coincides with the symmetric 
desired patent length of Type-II households. When the number of countries exceeds this threshold, even 
Type-II households would find the Nash-equilibrium patent length too short. Finally, equating (a22) and 
(a20) yields 
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Denote the value of ς  that solves (a24) by ς~ . For any given )1,0(~ ∈ς , there exists a N~  such that (a24) 
holds. In this case, SIGT  coincides with *IIT  .   □ 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium with 021 >== ςςς ) , both countries 
are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then, there must exist a ),0( ςς )(∈  such that 
when ςς )=1  and ],0[2 ςς (∈ , country 1 is worse off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
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Proof: The SIG best response function for country }2,1{∈s  is  
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The best response function shows that 1T  and 2T  are strategic substitutes and 0/ >∂∂ ssT ς . Therefore, 
the political-equilibrium pairs of patent length are 





−+
211
,ςςT  and 





+−
212
,ςςT .  
 Suppose that at the symmetric political equilibrium ),( SIGSIG TT  with 021 >== ςςς ) , both 
countries are better off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium ),( NENE TT . We know from 
Proposition 3 that such ς)  always exists. At ςς )=1  and 02 =ς , SIGTT >1  and NETT <2 . Therefore, 
there must exist a ),0( ςς )(∈  such that when ςς )=1  and ςς (=2 , NETT =2 . At this point, the social best 
response of country 1 is to set NETT =1 , but it is setting NESIG TTT >>1 . Therefore, it must be worse 
off compared to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Finally, if country 1 is worse off at ςς (=2 , it must also 
be worse off for ],0[2 ςς (∈ .                   □  
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1. NE refers to the Nash-equilibrium patent length, and the bold lines are the social best response 
functions of country 1 and country 2.   
2. PE refers to the political-equilibrium patent length, and the dotted lines are the SIG best response 
functions of country 1 and country 2.  
3. GO refers to the symmetric globally optimal patent length.  
2T  
1T  
GO 
PE 
NE 
Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium vs. Political Equilibrium  
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